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The Simple and Courageous Course: Industrial Patronage of Basic Research at the University of 
Chicago, 1945–1953 
 
Joseph D. Martin 
 
Abstract  
The University of Chicago was the site of a remarkable ideological alignment after World War II. 
Its chancellor, Robert Maynard Hutchins was one of mid-century America’s fiercest critics of 
science and of the moral stature of scientists. His administration nevertheless forged a détente with 
Chicago’s physical scientists in the process of establishing the Institutes for Basic Research, which 
consolidated the personnel and resources the Manhattan Project had brought to campus. 
Chicago’s left-leaning group of scientists and administrators then made common cause with a 
series of conservative industrial interests in order to fund the new institutes, on the basis that 
industry had an obligation to support basic research. This intersection of otherwise divergent 
ideological strands exposes the institutional malleability of patronage relationships in the years 




“Dress well. Put on your best clothes and let them be costly. Let your linen be immaculate. See that your boots 
are polished, and also that your hands are kept clean and your hair well brushed, not only in the morning, but 
kept so throughout the rough and tumble of the day.… People are judged by these apparent trifles of personal 
appearance far more than is often supposed, and the streets of Chicago soil the person hourly.”1 
—Frederick Taylor Gates, excerpt from fundraising manifesto, 1890 
 
When pitching the Cotton Council, it pays to wear seersucker. University of Chicago 
development officers Guy Martin and Arthur Feltes reasoned as much on a cloudy August day in 
1948 when they donned their best seersucker suits for a lunch in Washington, DC, with Leonard 
Smith, Acting Director of Utilization Research for the National Cotton Council of America. 
Martin and Feltes might well have had Frederick Taylor Gates’s canvassing advice in the back of 
their minds. Robert Maynard Hutchins, the university’s president, had plucked Gates’s nineteen-
point fundraising manifesto from a dusty file drawer and circulated it to Chicago’s development 
committee some years earlier, before World War II forestalled a planned fundraising initiative. 
When the campaign resumed after the war, it did so with a focus on attracting industrial support 
for Chicago’s new natural sciences laboratories; that was the mission for which the two 
development officers had groomed themselves. 
The Cotton Council was a potential patron of Chicago’s newly formed Institute of 
Radiobiology and Biophysics, one of three new institutes, and the University’s representatives were 
charged with selling the basic research vision upon which those institutes were founded. The 
seersucker suits, Martin and Feltes reported, “made a good impression on Mr. Smith, who 
launched into a 45 minute lecture on what a fine and useful material cotton was,” pausing for 
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breath “long enough to tell us that he was an organic chemist.”2 Smith, gratified by his dining 
companions’ sartorial sense, received their pitch cheerfully. “He appeared fully familiar with the 
distinction between basic and applied research that the University is emphasizing,” Martin and 
Feltes reported. “He believes that agriculture has not devoted the proper amount of time and 
money to basic research in the biological sciences, and believes that in time this amount can be 
increased.”3 Although Smith cautioned that the Council’s research budget was entirely devoted to 
applied work, the natty duo left the meeting feeling they had won a sympathetic ear and rated 
Smith and the Cotton Council as good contacts to pursue in the future. 
Through the late 1940s, University of Chicago faculty, staff, administrators, and alumni 
held hundreds of similar meetings as part of an aggressive development campaign to amass support 
for its new research institutes, which included the Institute for Nuclear Studies and the Institute 
for the Study of Metals alongside the Institute of Radiobiology and Biophysics.4 The Institutes for 
Basic Research (IBRs), as they came to be known, were established to cement the legacy of 
Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory. Colloquially known as the Met Lab, this wartime nuclear 
research installation—housed in the west stands of the university’s football stadium, Stagg Field—
investigated the properties of uranium and plutonium for the Manhattan Project. It was where 
Enrico Fermi’s team produced the world’s first controlled nuclear chain reaction on December 2, 
1942, generating the most rousing applause the stadium had heard since the varsity football team 
took its last snap in 1939.5 Chicago’s physical scientists and administrators sought to capitalize on 
the cultural currency nuclear research earned from the success of the Manhattan Project. They 
originally called the laboratories the Nuclear Institutes or Nucleonics Institutes and courted 
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industrial support by emphasizing the wide-ranging potential of radioisotopes and the as-yet-
unforeseen potential hidden within the atomic nucleus. 
When sketched in such broad strokes, Chicago’s campaign seems to mirror institutional 
changes around the United States that rebuilt university campuses after World War II and brought 
academic, industrial, and government—especially military—research into closer accord.6 By 
organizing natural science research within laboratories that drew upon resources from throughout 
the university, Chicago participated in the trend toward centralized research infrastructure 
pioneered by East Coast institutions like Cornell University and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT).7 By clothing themselves in cotton to cater to the expectations of a potential 
patron, Martin and Feltes acted out a microcosm of the Cold War reorientation of academic 
research programs toward the demands of military and industrial funders. Literature on industrial 
and government patronage of universities focuses on the shaping effect money has on the type of 
research conducted in academic settings. Just as individuals make wardrobe choices to flatter 
funders, historians have suggested, institutions manicured their research profiles to compete in a 
Cold War context flooded with military and industrial dollars.8 Stanford University and MIT in 
particular have been held up as examples of how military and industrial interests imposed their 
research priorities on academic science during the Cold War.9 
The encroachment of industrial and government interests into campus laboratories fits 
within a larger story about the increasingly pragmatic bent of American universities during the 
Cold War. John Dewey, the godfather of American pragmatism, was a potent intellectual force 
driving reforms in American education, both before and after World War II.10 The collective 
mission of American higher education and its responsibility to the body politic were reexamined 
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and renegotiated during the Cold War. The result was a more populist academy. Military and 
industry money poured into universities alongside beneficiaries of the GI bill (formally, the 
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944), who might previously have had little opportunity for 
higher education. Demographic shifts among the student population prefigured the relevance and 
responsiveness of American universities to a wide array of political and cultural currents.11 The 
outward willingness Martin and Feltes showed to bend to the expectations of an industry group, 
and their solicitation of its patronage in the first place, seem largely compatible with these trends.  
Upon closer scrutiny, however, the University of Chicago sits uncomfortably within these 
narratives. Patronage relationships, first of all, are negotiated relationships.12 Historians addressing 
these negotiations and their outcomes, need to confront them empirically—the mere presence of a 
financial relationship does not tell us how a funder’s interests were or were not reflected in the use 
of their funds.13 Rather than welcoming industrial and government patrons into the deliberations 
that defined research priorities, Chicago courted external funding for a basic research program of 
its own devising and fought vigorously to ensure that those funders had no expectations that their 
contributions would go toward producing applied windfalls. Chicago’s development program 
demonstrated that the influence of money on research could be dragged from the shadows and 
made a central element of funding negotiations. The university’s representatives made repeated 
and explicit assurances, in both internal deliberations and external negotiations, that factors such 
as the defense establishment’s technical needs and the economic interests of industrial patrons 
would not sway the university’s research agenda. That agenda, in turn, had to fit within an 
institutional context defined by the imperious Hutchins’s contrarian views about the proper 
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nature and role of higher education, which contrasted the pragmatic trends of the age and 
included sharp antagonism toward the sciences. 
To what extent assurances that external funding would not influence university research 
were born out in laboratory practice is a separate and open question. Nevertheless, the 
unequivocal and uncompromising basic research ideology Chicago pursued after World War II 
puts it at odds with well-known narratives of the convergence of academic, government, and 
industrial interests in the early Cold War.14 This contrast raises the question the of extent to which 
Chicago was a distinctive institution, thumbing its nose at national trends, and the extent to which 
it was emblematic of larger currents that have evaded sustained historical attention. The story of 
the IBRs and the development campaign mobilized to fund them, framed within timeworn and as-
yet unresolved disagreements about the roles and responsibilities that institutions of higher 
learning in the United States hold, is a forum for exploring that question. 
Doing so requires examining the productive intersection of three ostensibly conflicting 
ideological strands. The first is Hutchins’s own vision for the university, which emphasized liberal 
education grounded in the humanities and regarded the sciences, and the specialization that often 
came with them, with suspicion. The second is the outlook of Chicago’s physical scientists, so 
often the target of Hutchins’s disdain. Chicago had been a key Manhattan Project research site, 
but it also produced the Franck Report advising against the military use of nuclear weapons. It was 
from Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory that the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists emerged, promoting 
social responsibility around nuclear weapons by disseminating accessible, policy-relevant scientific 
information. The third strand is the ideology of the IBR’s industrial patrons. Unlike both 
Hutchins—a committed political liberal—and the Chicago scientists, industrialists tended to be 
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conservative. Their interests lay not in the advancement of science per se, but in the rehabilitation 
corporate America’s image, which had taken a beating in the Great Depression. The IBRs emerged 
at the unlikely overlap of these ideological interests, and so offer a revealing case through which to 
examine the flexibility of emerging patronage patterns after World War II.15 
 
Grand Visions: Gridiron and Great Books 
To the extent that Chicago was idiosyncratic in its dealings with industry, it was in large 
measure due to the influence of its young, headstrong leader. The Institutes for Basic Research 
were funded in accordance with a research ideology that intertwined with the prevailing 
educational philosophy at the University of Chicago. That philosophy was held and enacted by 
Robert Maynard Hutchins, president of the university from 1929 until 1945, when he became 
chancellor, a post he held through his departure in 1951. Hutchins is best remembered as a brash 
educational reformer, a keen proselyte of the Great Books curriculum, and as the man who 
decommissioned Chicago’s varsity football program in 1939. These administrative agendas are 
emblematic of the educational ethos Hutchins espoused, which also guided the founding of the 
Institutes for Basic Research. 
Hutchins’s ambitious and idiosyncratic approach to higher education was still forming 
when he assumed the University of Chicago presidency at the tender age of thirty. It matured 
during his first decade in office through tense standoffs with the faculty over his proposed 
curricular reforms and his close association with the educational philosopher and incorrigible 
provocateur Mortimer Adler, whom he had installed on the Chicago faculty shortly after arriving 
in Hyde Park. By the time Hutchins brought the axe down on the football program in 1939, both 
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his vision for the university and his plan for achieving it were firmly established.16 Hutchins’s 
approach to football and the undergraduate curriculum are worth exploring further because they 
highlight how analogous motives shaped the evolution of the IBRs. 
Chicago Maroons football, under the direction of the renowned coach Amos Alonzo Stagg, 
had been an early twentieth-century powerhouse. The Maroons were the first to challenge Ivy 
League dominance and their success spurred college football’s rise as an American cultural 
phenomenon.17 The heights the team reached in the 1920s made Hutchins’s decision to eliminate 
varsity football all the more striking.18 The Maroons had fallen a long way by 1939, but their 
struggles were a pretext for ending the program, not the motivation. Hutchins deplored the circus 
atmosphere surrounding football games, feeling it distracted from intellectual pursuits. He had 
developed this attitude during his undergraduate years at Yale, where football fever was one 
element of what he regarded as an unserious approach to education geared to pampered high-
society scions. Yale, to Hutchins, was “a place where you could get excited about girls or liquor or 
parties or athletic contests, but it wasn’t a place where you’d get excited about learning.”19 This was 
the foil against which he modeled Chicago, including his decision to deemphasize varsity athletics. 
Despite the witticism he was wont to repeat that his policy was to lie down until he felt 
better whenever he felt the urge to exercise, Hutchins did not object to athletics per se. He rather 
distained the popular notion, borrowed from a nineteenth-century aristocratic British ethos, that 
athletics instilled moral qualities academic study did not.20 Prepared for backlash from students, 
alumni, and the general public, on the basis of the ubiquity of this notion, Hutchins got ahead of 
the story with a sharply worded op-ed in a December 1938 issue of The Saturday Evening Post. 
Hutchins’s screed, entitled “Gate Receipts and Glory,” distinguished between “athletics,” the 
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recreational pursuit of physical wellbeing, and “athleticism,” the coopting of amateur athletics by 
monetary interests. His catalogue of the myths of athleticism summarized the popular 
understanding of the benefits university athletic programs offered: 
Athletics, we are told, produces well-rounded men, filled with the spirit of fair play. 
Athletics is good for the health of the players; it is also good for the morals of the 
spectators. Leadership on the playing field means leadership in life. The Duke of 
Wellington said so. Athletes are red-blooded Americans, and athletic colleges are bulwarks 
against Communism. Gate receipts are used to build laboratories and to pay for those 
sports that can’t pay for themselves. Football is purely a supplement to study. And without 
a winning team a college cannot hope to attract the students or the gifts which its work 
requires.21 
In setting set out the pernicious effects of these myths, Hutchins reserved his sternest 
disapprobation for the connection between alumni giving and the success on the gridiron. When 
Hutchins ended varsity football, it was in large measure because he deplored seeing the fortunes of 
the university dictated by matters he considered tangential (and sometimes anathema) to 
educational concerns.22 
The same conviction that motivated Hutchins’s enmity for football drove his effort to 
reform undergraduate education at Chicago. In a controversial move shortly after taking over the 
presidency, Hutchins appointed Mortimer Adler to a joint appointment in philosophy, 
psychology, and law. If some of the Chicago faculty found the youthful Hutchins callow, his 
exertion of executive authority to appoint Adler, two years his junior, to an important post across 
influential departments did little to assuage this concern. The philosophers in particular 
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interpreted Adler’s appointment as a shot across their bow. The great pragmatist John Dewey had 
left Chicago for Columbia University in 1904, but the philosophy department still owed much to 
his legacy. Adler, who preferred the metaphysical approach of Saint Thomas Aquinas to hard-
nosed Deweyan pragmatism, seemed impossibly old fashioned to Dewey acolytes like George 
Herbert Mead, who became a vocal opponent of Hutchins’s agenda. Dewey himself spoke out 
against Hutchins’s reforms, charging, for instance, that the Great Books movement that Hutchins 
and Adler championed amounted to “an open and avowed attempt to return to that dualistic 
separation of ideas and action, of the ‘intellectual’ and the ‘practical,’ of liberal and service arts, 
that marked the feudal age.”23 Hutchins was eventually forced to restrict Adler’s appointment to 
the law school, and his friend’s outspoken Thomism would continue to engender skepticism of 
Hutchins’s reform efforts, especially among faculty in philosophy and the social sciences. 
Hutchins at first envisioned restructuring the whole of American higher education. He 
advocated merging the last two years of high school and the first two of a traditional four-year 
undergraduate education into a four-year program of general education, after which the Bachelor 
of Arts would be awarded. The final two years would be reserved for study in a specialized 
academic field. The aim would be to combat pressure from academic departments to introduce 
specialized training earlier and earlier, which he felt eroded the broad educational base necessary 
for responsible citizenship and the unfettered pursuit of understanding. In 1936 he set out this 
vision in a short manifesto entitled The Higher Learning in America.24 It echoed Thorstein Veblen’s 
1918 book of the same title, in which Veblen worried that “the intrusion of business principles in 
the universities goes to weaken and retard the pursuit of learning, and therefore to defeat the ends 
for which a university is maintained.”25 
 11 
Hutchins, eighteen years later, shared Veblen’s concern about corrosive financial pressures. 
His own characterization of the problems with higher education began: 
If the problem is to clarify the higher learning, let us examine the causes of its confusion. 
The first of them is very vulgar; it is the love of money. It is sad but true that when an 
institution determines to do something in order to get money it must lose its soul, and 
frequently it does not get the money. Money comes to education in three ways—from 
students, from donors, and from legislatures. To frame a policy in order to appeal to any 
one of these three is fatal, and, as I have suggested, often futile as well.… Dependence on 
the casual interest of donors means that nobody can tell from one year to another what a 
university’s policy is. It will become next year whatever somebody is willing to pay to make 
it. I do not mean, of course, that universities do not need money and that they should not 
try to get it. I mean only that they should have an educational policy and then try to 
finance it, instead of letting financial accidents determine their educational policy.26 
The educational policy Hutchins established at Chicago was not quite so sweeping as he hoped, 
but it was nonetheless ambitious. The College, devoted to undergraduate education, became a two-
year program in the foundations of general knowledge. Class attendance was optional and anyone 
could obtain a BA upon completing the general exams.27 A culture of excellent teaching and lively 
conversation was entrusted to keep the classrooms full.28 
The goal of a course of general education was not to prepare students for specialized study 
in a particular discipline, or to train them for a profession, but to engender the type of broad, 
humanistic thinking that could confront the moral challenges of the age. This goal reached its 
apotheosis in a course Hutchins and Adler delivered each year to a handpicked group of students 
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based on the curriculum Adler had studied at Columbia under John Erskine, the architect of the 
Great Books movement.29 Hutchins was never able to eliminate the incentives that inspired 
departments to demanded an opportunity to recruit students in their first two years, and so never 
realized his ambition to impose this system at full scale. It nevertheless represents the purest 
expression of his philosophy of education. The fervor for a rigorous, humanizing institution that 
fueled Hutchins’s objections to football also shaped his thinking about undergraduate education. 
It would condition his approach to scientific research infrastructure as well. 
Although Hutchins considered the natural sciences an important part of a strong 
university, he had little knowledge of them and, revering ideas over facts as he did, saw them as 
ancillary to true education. “I yield to no one in my admiration for and belief in the accumulation 
of data, the collection of facts, and the advance of the empirical sciences,” he wrote in his 1936 
manifesto. “Taken together these constitute one of the grand activities of modern times. It must be 
continued and encouraged. I wish merely to point out that this activity must be conducted in such 
a way as not to confuse or prevent that intellectual training and development which in my view are 
education.”30 His view shortly after assuming the presidency was that the value of the sciences lay 
principally in research and advanced training, but that they had little to do with education, 
properly understood. He was a humanist at heart, and his educational agenda championed the 
university’s power to instill humanistic values. 
By the end of World War II, his views had sharpened considerably. When he departed 
Chicago in 1951, he viewed scientists themselves with evident disdain; he thought them 
intellectually parochial and held them responsible for the degradation of wider regard for the arts 
and humanities. Speaking at Chicago’s Foundation for the Study of American Institutions in 
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1953, shortly after resigning his chancellorship, Hutchins claimed: “The reverence that natural 
science has inspired is in large part responsible for the steady narrowing of education that the 
progress of specialization has caused during the last thirty years,” and lamented that “the scientific 
method has discredited the methods of history, philosophy, and art.”31 With characteristic 
panache, he developed this position in a 1963 pamphlet on the role of scientists in politics: “My 
view, based on long and painful observation, is that professors are somewhat worse than other 
people, and that scientists are somewhat worse than other professors.” He suggested that 
scrupulous commitment to standards of scientific conduct within narrow specialties freed scientists 
to be looser in their other dealings—“the narrower the field in which a man must tell the truth, the 
wider is the area in which he is free to lie”—and insisted that scientist’s illusions that they required 
no metaphysical assumptions led them routinely into error. Hutchins deplored the “paralyzing 
educational repercussions” of the hubris he perceived in the mid-twentieth-century American 
scientific community, which placed science on an epistemic plane above other academic pursuits. 
Seduced by facts, Hutchins complained, over-specialized scientists rendered themselves unwilling 
and unable to engage with areas of thought beyond their increasingly narrow research.32 
Hutchins’s shift from quiescence about science to active skepticism over his decades at 
Chicago can be traced both to the conflicts his administrative agenda generated and to World War 
II. Chicago scientists—along with its philosophers, whom Hutchins regarded as under the sway of 
scientific thinking—most fiercely opposed his educational reforms. At a time when the natural 
sciences and medicine were specializing, scientific training began to require longer periods of 
apprenticeship. Science departments pushed hard against Hutchins’s efforts to devote a full two 
years of the undergraduate degree to generalized study. 
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The war, however, was the more significant factor in shaping Hutchins’s attitude. Nowhere 
were the moral risks of science—especially when applied to technical problems—clearer for 
Hutchins than in nuclear weapons, which had been manufactured, in part, on his campus. The 
bomb heightened Hutchins’s feeling that broad, humanistic education was essential to confront 
the challenges facing American society; he began to see science as a source of the moral challenges 
his system of education was designed to train students to confront. 
A staunch isolationist before Pearl Harbor, Hutchins executed a sharp about-face after the 
Japanese attack and put his institution’s resources at the disposal of the mobilizing war machine. 
The University of Chicago provided technical and linguistic education to servicemen, trained 
Army and Navy pilots, and led the Manhattan Project’s research into the properties of uranium 
and plutonium in the coyly named Metallurgical Laboratory.33 The central role his university 
played in bringing about the bomb did nothing to soften Hutchins’s reaction to its use against 
Japanese civilians, which he condemned with the same alacrity and conviction that compelled him 
to temper his isolationism after Pearl Harbor. 
At the time, the university hosted the Chicago Round Table, a popular radio program 
syndicated by the National Broadcasting Corporation that featured debates and disquisitions on 
current events. Hutchins used this program as a pulpit from which to air his concerns about the 
technology of war in general and the bomb in particular. On August 12, 1945, just a few days after 
the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hutchins announced, “the United States had lost its 
moral prestige.”34 Ever the pedagogue, Hutchins was already concerned about the challenges rapid 
scientific and technological development along military lines posed for higher education, 
proclaiming: “If we are going to have a society which knows what to do with these constant 
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surprises from the physical scientists, we are going to have an entirely different level of general 
intelligence in the community from the one which we have been used to in the past.”35 Science, 
previously a distraction from liberal education in Hutchins’s mind, had become one of the most 
pressing challenges the liberally educated would have to confront. 
Aware that seemingly abstruse research had made nuclear weapons possible, Hutchins was 
little moved by assurances that basic science was an inherent good to be pursued unfettered. This 
conviction, combined with his dim view of the moral standing of the sciences, informed his 
attitude to the post–World War II expansion of Chicago’s scientific research infrastructure. The 
Institutes for Basic Research were a continuation of efforts that had developed during the war and 
a mechanism to consolidate the resources those efforts had brought to campus. The precise form 
they took, however, and the plans to support them, reflect the subtleties of Chicago’s institutional 
mission and Hutchins’s hand in crafting it. The Institutes were conceived, in part, to ensconce 
basic nuclear physics research in the humanizing confines of a university. For Hutchins, natural 
knowledge was ennobled, not by virtue of its purity, but through thoughtful custodianship.  
Hutchins’s mission can therefore be understood as an effort to humanize the sciences, 
cutting sharply against the grain of concurrent efforts, even on his own campus, to scientize all of 
human knowledge.36 The IBRs represent, in part, an answer to Hutchins’s concerns about the 
moral dangers of scientific hubris. After World War II, he viewed science as the source of many of 
the most pressing contemporary moral challenges. The University of Chicago, if Hutchins had his 
way, would not combat it by bending to the will of government and industry, even thought it had 
been happy to do its part to fight fascism. The sciences were valuable just to the extent that they 
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could cultivate truth, and industry was a valuable partner just to the extent that it could help 
prevent military interests from perverting basic science. 
In great measure, Chicago’s approach to science after the war was a reaction to its 
participation in the war effort, but it was also consistent with Hutchins’s prewar philosophy of 
education. Having academic and financial decisions dictated by industry or government was, for 
Hutchins, little different from having such factors dictated by football. He therefore faced a 
challenge navigating his institution through a post–World War II world in which corporate and 
military patrons were eager to enter into financial arrangements with university scientists. As the 
next section makes clear, the basic research ethos that the IBRs adopted forged a functional 
alliance between Chicago’s scientists and its administration, permitting the institution to articulate 
a consistent ideology to its patrons. 
 
Founding the Institutes for Basic Research 
 For all his administrative ambition, Hutchins could not have pressed his agenda without 
the science faculty’s cooperation. Though they been unreceptive to his 1930s educational reforms, 
Chicago’s physical scientists made common cause with Hutchins through a basic research vision. 
Their motives were different. Hutchins, for all his concern about science and scientists, knew 
prominence in the physical sciences was integral to the university’s reputation. He sought to 
ensure, though, that Chicago scientists were accountable to the university rather than to external 
entities such as industry and government. In 1945, in view of the scientific accomplishments of the 
war, he commented: “The enormous acceleration of science and technology must somehow be 
matched by an intensification of all those processes which help us to understand what we ought to 
 17 
do with science and technology.”37 Hutchins wanted his scientists subjected to the same 
humanizing influences he had sought to cultivate through educational reform. That motivated 
institutional measures aimed at controlling financial incentives, such as employment contracts that 
required all external earnings to be forfeited to the university and careful attention to the manner 
in which scientific facilities were funded. Chicago’s scientists, for their part, appreciated the 
assurance that they would have complete freedom to follow self-defined research agendas within 
the Institutes for Basic Research. 
The Institutes were conceived to consolidate the physical resources and personnel that 
Manhattan Project contracts had brought to Hyde Park, and plans were afoot before the war 
ended. Chicago’s efforts along these lines—though they mirrored similar efforts at institutions like 
MIT, which parlayed wartime radar work into a series of interdepartmental laboratories—ruffled 
feathers elsewhere in the scientific community, and in Washington, after an August 13, 1945, 
Chicago Tribune article exposed the university’s intentions.38 The article, which Hutchins dismissed 
as “in harmony with the Tribune’s policy of representing the city of Chicago as the leader in all 
fields of endeavor,”39 listed the eminent scientists war work had lured to Chicago from other 
institutions and bragged: “There can be no better indication of who the scientific world thinks did 
the real job on atomic energy than this migration to Chicago by so distinguished a group,” 
identifying the new “institutes of nuclear physics” as the mechanism that would keep them there.40 
A chastisement from General Leslie Groves, chief administrator of the Manhattan Project, 
soon crossed Hutchins’s desk:  
From the papers, I note that you are planning on establishing an institute which would 
include among its fields that of nuclear physics. I have had many discussions in the past 
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with Dr. Arthur H. Compton, who has expressed the view that the University of Chicago 
should be a center of such research in the years to come, and that it should receive 
Government-owned equipment which has been in use at the Metallurgical Laboratory, 
including the Argonne installation, during the last few years. I feel it incumbent to inform 
you, in order that there may be no misunderstanding, that there can be no commitment 
with the University at this time on the part of the War Department in this respect.41 
Hutchins hastened to allay Groves’s concerns: “The University was under the impression that it 
was performing a great public service by holding together a group in this field which might 
otherwise disintegrate. Its plan was not to monopolize a scientific area but to promote its 
development by retaining at a strategic location a combination which was certain to give impetus 
to this work on a national scale. Far from seeking a monopoly, the University regards itself as a 
training ground for the country and particularly for the Middle West.”42 Tensions eased after 
Groves visited Chicago October 1945 to present a War Department scroll recognizing the 
institution’s contributions to the bomb-development effort. Hutchins received a note from a 
much-reassured Groves afterwards, who wrote: “Your outline of the University’s future policies was 
particularly interesting,” and reiterated his appreciation of the Met Lab’s wartime labors.43 
If chagrin over Chicago’s opportunism continued to simmer, it did little to slow Hutchins, 
who tapped William Houlder Zachariasen to chair the physics department and empowered him to 
make whatever personnel decisions he deemed necessary to bolster its national standing. 
Zachariasen and Walter Bartky, Dean of the Division of Physical Sciences, undertook a rapid and 
sometimes ruthless renovation of the physical sciences faculty. The Division of Physical Sciences 
added as many new staff members in the twelve months following the war as they had in the 
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previous twelve years.44 This strategy invited further recriminations from academic scientists at 
other institutions. In addition to hiring new PhDs such as John Simpson and Anthony Turkevich, 
Chicago lured a stable of physicists and chemists away from Columbia University that included 
Nobel Prize–winners Enrico Fermi and Harold Urey, and future laureate Maria Goeppert Mayer 
(who, accompanying her husband, the chemist Joseph Mayer, worked unpaid).45 Many, particularly 
those the East Coast, accused Zachariasen and his colleagues of conspiring to corner the market on 
nuclear science and compromising the good of the national community. 
Chicago’s rapid, prestige-conscious expansion was not without collateral damage. Physics 
faculty were in danger of losing their jobs if their research did not pass muster with Zachariasen, 
who undertook “the unpleasant task of ridding its staff of every member on temporary tenure who 
did not belong in a great department.”46 One target for dismissal was Niel F. Beardsley, who had 
managed the physics department’s optical shop since 1931. In light of Beardsley’s age—then fifty-
three—and his long service to the department, Zachariasen was willing to keep him on should be 
unable to find another position, but he insisted that Beardsley be kept ignorant of this contingency 
so it would not prevent him from seeking employment elsewhere.47 Beardsley secured work as a 
research engineer with the Wright Air Development Center in 1946 and began a career in 
industry that eventually led him to the defense contractor Raytheon. On June 7, 1960, he and six 
others disappeared when the Raytheon research vessel Marie sank off Santa Cruz Island.48 
This was the fervent moment in which the Institutes for Basic Research emerged. They 
represented the lynchpin of the plan to entice the core Met Lab staff to remain in Chicago while 
also attracting new talent. The west stands of Stagg Field, sometimes referred to as the “rat holes” 
by physical chemistry professor Thorfin Hogness, were aging, in poor repair, and lacked the 
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flexibility required of a modern laboratory.49 The design proposal for the building that would 
house the three new institutes included ample space for growth. An opportunity to build a new 
laboratory from the ground up offered further incentive for the Manhattan scientists to remain 
and an enticement to the Midwest for young recruits. 
Facilities were but one element of the draw for Chicago’s new hires. If the transition to 
peacetime presented the opportunity to expand the workforce and rebuild facilities, it also offered 
the chance to define a consistent research ideology. Chicago promised its new hires “the freedom 
and flexibility essential to the pursuit of fundamental research.”50 The decision that the IBRs 
would be dedicated to basic research was in line with both Hutchins’s philosophy and the wishes 
of the science faculty, many of whom had been disillusioned by war work. Chicago scientists had 
drafted the “Franck Report,” which warned of dire political and moral consequences if the US 
used the bomb in a military capacity against civilian targets, and had formed the Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists after the war to publicize the perils posed by nuclear weapons.51 The assurance that their 
work would not be coopted for further governmental or commercial projects therefore soothed 
their unease over the uses to which their work had been put during the war. 
Chicago’s upper administration and its physical scientists found common ground in this 
shared research ideology, even if they came to it by different routes. Settling on a basic research 
mission as the foundation of the IBRs was therefore straightforward. Funding it would prove more 
complicated. Both the military and industry were primed to contribute unprecedented funds to 
university research in the years immediately after the war, but those charged with funding the IBRs 
proved hesitant to accept funding before a clear understanding was in place that it would serve 
their commitment to basic research. Cyril Stanley Smith, a metallurgist who had spent the bulk of 
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the war at Los Alamos turning his expertise to fissionable metals, was selected to head the Institute 
for the Study of Metals (ISM) in June 1945.52 Upon arriving in Chicago, he set about mustering 
support for his new laboratory. The consensus approach to funding the IBRs was evident when he 
met with one Dr. Pierce of the New Jersey Zinc Company about supporting student fellowships at 
the ISM. Pierce was hesitant to commit to an institute without a proven track record of producing 
applicable results and expressed skepticism about whether the organization of the institute was 
likely to produce them in the future. Smith, although disappointed, concluded: “I do not believe 
that we should depart from our present standards purely to gain a little easy money.”53 
The basic research ideal united an administration and a cadre of researchers who had 
previously been at loggerheads, and might otherwise have remained so. It gave Hutchins cover to 
propose institutional arrangements that would, in his eyes, insulate scientists from potentially 
corrupting external influences. It provided researchers with the assurances that they would have a 
well-resourced opportunity to pursue their own interests, free from the top-down mission 
orientations and secrecy regimes that had governed their wartime work. With a plan to construct 
three new laboratories in place and consensus on a mission to guide them, it remained to sell that 
mission to funders. 
 
Funding the Institutes for Basic Research 
The IBRs began their life as the Nuclear Institutes, or Nucleonics Institutes, before an 
aggrieved Cyril Stanley Smith objected that such branding would deter potential patrons interested 
in the work of the Institute for the Study of Metals.54 Smith prevailed, and basic research language 
supplanted nuclear language as the 1940s drew to a close. The early emphasis on the nuclear, 
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however, helps explain the funding strategy Chicago chose, which involved approaching industry 
as the principal means of external support, from the conviction that industrial patronage was both 
compatible with the institutes’ basic research mission, and that corporations could be convinced to 
support it. 
The months immediately after the war witnessed a conflict between military and civilian 
interest over who would control nuclear weapons, materials, and energy—and the research into 
them. The May–Johnson Bill, introduced to the US House of Representatives in October 1945, 
would have given the military province over nuclear affairs. In response, the Chicago Committee 
for Civilian Control of Atomic Energy formed, with the mission “to fight any attempts to place 
control of this new power in the hands of the military.”55 The legislation that eventually passed, 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, was considerably less restrictive, but fears lingered that the federal 
government would apply a heavy hand to its oversight of nuclear research. Chicago was 
incentivized to pursue a diversified funding base for its new institutes, and was convinced that 
industry could be enlisted into the basic research mission on the grounds that it would prevent 
government secrecy regimes from foreclosing a promising research area with potential new avenues 
for commercialization.56	
Even if the image of Martin and Feltes donning their cotton suits seems to reflect an 
institution primed to kowtow to industrial interests, this was not borne out in the substance of the 
pitch Chicago’s representatives made to their potential industrial patrons. A brochure prepared to 
attract industrial sponsors noted that applications could likely result from the work the new 
institutes conducted, but absolved the university of any responsibility to proceed with such 
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considerations in mind. The pitch to potential sponsors described the type of relationship the 
university envisioned:  
A number of leading American business organizations, recognizing that progress in applied 
science and industrial technology depends upon the steady advance of fundamental 
science, have approached the University to learn how they might contribute to the support 
of the Institutes and avail themselves of the benefits of their work. Because it is the 
intention of the University to promote mutually valuable exchanges of information 
between business organizations and the staffs of the Institute, to accelerate industrial 
applications of basic scientific discoveries, and to preserve complete freedom of 
investigation within the Institutes, the University has adopted the plan of Industrial 
Membership.  
Member corporations would be entitled to copies of the institutes’ publications and written 
reports, to send representatives to quarterly meetings for industrial sponsors, and to receive royalty-
free license to any patents produced through institute research. The list of privileges excluded any 
provision for informing the directions of the university’s research programs.57 
Chicago’s written pitch to industrial sponsors outlines a clear division of labor: the IBRs 
would generate fundamental scientific understanding, which it would then be the responsibility of 
the industrial entities to apply. This document does place significant emphasis on the potential 
usefulness of basic research, which reflects the audience to which it was directed. The reports of 
the in-person meetings with industrial representatives, which were confidential and had a limited 
circulation, and were therefore much franker, provide a fuller picture of how the university sought 
to fund its basic research. 
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The University of Chicago had a long tradition of local canvassing for financial support. In 
1890 Frederick Taylor Gates, a Baptist minister and John D. Rockefeller’s financial guru, 
composed a nineteen-point canvassing crib sheet based on his experience mustering private 
support for a new Baptist college in the Chicago area.58 Much of Gates’s advice concerned personal 
presentation and demeanor and demonstrated keen sensitivity to the psychology of his “victims,” 
as he called them. They should be kept in good humor, he wrote, given the impression that any 
gift—including its amount—was their own idea, and allowed to talk at any length they chose 
without meeting disagreement or resistance. He gave dress and personal grooming top billing, 
advising in his first point, quoted in part in the epigraph of this paper: “it would be necessary to go 
to hotels occasionally, consult the bootblack, the lavatory, and brush up. This is no trifling thing. 
People size up one’s importance and dignity very largely by his personal appearance and the size of 
their gifts if not indeed any gift at all will depend not little on their estimation of the importance 
and dignity of the canvassers.”59 
Gates’s insights into the psychology of glad-handing are timeless, but his manual also 
reflects some contingencies of his context. First, he assumed any canvassing program would be 
seeking a broad base of support, that the program or institution seeking funds would want to 
subsist on a large number of small bequests. Second, he admonished his fundraisers to avoid any 
impression that they were engaged in a commercial transaction. Point seven: “Appeal only to the 
noblest motives. His own mind will suggest to him all the more selfish ones, but he will not wish 
you to suppose that he has thought of these. He will wish you to believe; he will wish himself to 
believe that he is giving only from the highest motives.”60 A broad foundation of small 
contributions made from an ideological commitment to the nobility of the enterprise they 
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supported was exactly what Chicago sought when soliciting support for its IBRs in the 1940s. 
Hutchins distributed Gates’s list to the Committee on Development of Chicago’s Board of 
Trustees in 1937 as plans for a new fundraising campaign were underway, and Gates’s fingerprints 
are evident in the campaign that materialized after the war. 
Nevertheless, the focus on corporate support was new. Before World War II, the bulk of 
financial support for the University of Chicago, aside from tuition, came from individual bequests 
and the ongoing patronage of the Rockefeller Foundation. Fundraising efforts through the 1930s 
targeted wealthy local individuals first and foremost. In 1936 a detailed fundraising plan outlined a 
tightly circumscribed role for corporate patronage. Corporate giving, the report noted “is limited 
almost entirely to fellowships and special research projects which can be represented to other 
stockholders as good investments in their own financial interest,” and concluded: “Although there 
are possibilities of interesting contributions from corporations, the chief potentialities in this 
direction lie in gaining the interest of wealthy persons connected with them.”61 A decade later, 
industry assumed the pivotal role in the university’s development plans. 
Industry’s interests, however, did not. Each of the meetings Chicago fundraisers conducted 
involved articulating their basic research vision, and Chicago’s representatives did not withhold 
their judgments of anyone whose appreciation of this vision they found wanting. In October 1948, 
Hutchins and Hogness met with the president of the American Tobacco Company. Vincent 
Riggio was seventy years old and on the brink of leaving the presidency for a sinecure as chairman 
of the board of directors. Hutchins and Hogness found him aloof and disengaged during a 
conversation in which Riggio’s aide did most of the talking. Hutchins scoffed that “he wished he 
had an assistant like that to make all his decisions for him.” If they were unimpressed with Riggio, 
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their verdict on American Tobacco’s research director, Hiram R. Hanmer, was even harsher. 
Hanmer gave them “the impression of not being too bright.” Hogness recalled that he and 
Hutchins had wondered for some time why research directors tended to sit so low in corporate 
hierarchies. “If all research directors were like Mr. Hamner [sic],” he remarked, “the answer to that 
question would be apparent.”62 Despite Riggio’s disinterest and Hanmer’s failure to impress, 
American Tobacco and Chicago’s IBRs signed a $50,000 per year sponsorship agreement.63 
Similar derision flowed freely after meetings with any industry representative who did not 
share Chicago’s basic research vision. The research director at the National Biscuit Company 
(better known as Nabisco) “gave the impression that he had been working so long with soda 
crackers that he had begun to look like one.”64 A manager at the Armco Steel Corporation, Anson 
Hayes, scandalized Cyril Stanley Smith by enumerating the qualities of a good industrial researcher 
as: “a) good appearance, b) an affable social nature, c) a realization that his own ideas were not 
always right, and d) (somewhat belatedly, some intellectual ability).” Smith concluded: “I do not 
believe that Dr. Hayes understands basic research or the University of Chicago. This is somewhat 
embarrassing since he took his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago.”65 Overt disdain for 
industrialists who refused to accept basic research as a shared responsibility of universities and 
industry reflects the uncompromising commitment the development campaign maintained to the 
founding principles of the IBRs. 
Taken as a whole, the reports of individual fundraising meetings send a slightly different 
message than the manifesto potential sponsors received. Whereas the written rhetoric suggests that 
IBR research would be framed with some attention to future applications, the meeting reports 
demonstrate that any industrial sponsor would bear the responsibility not just for pursuing 
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applications, but also for identifying those aspects of IBR research ripe for industrial exploitation. 
The challenge this posed to corporate researchers was best expressed by Edward R. Gay, the vice 
president of St. Regis Paper Company, in a meeting with Hogness:  
He recognized the two sides of this question: (1) the support of basic research in this 
country by industry for its own sake—to keep government from monopolizing it; (2) to be 
in on something which might put St. Regis Paper in an advantageous position to cover its 
competitors. The first of these he could understand; the second one he thought was rather 
nebulous. He argued that if they were going to go into this plan with us and take full 
advantage of it, it would be necessary for the company to hire extra men who were capable 
of understanding our program.66 
The work of translating basic research into applications was not straightforward and some 
corporations were unwilling to buy into to Chicago’s ideological program unless they saw plausible 
prospects for commercialization, which often demanded considerable in-house research expertise. 
When the IBRs solicited testimonials from existing sponsors in 1948, the responses 
reflected the link between amenability to a basic research ideology and expectations of future 
competitive advantages. The Pittsburgh Plate Glass company felt that “direct dividends in scientific 
knowledge and the indirect ultimate benefits to our country and mankind generally are certain to 
be of great value to the company, and we believe that close contact with the University program 
should result in earlier practical applications to industrial problems.”67 The Celanese Corporation 
of America was “happy to avail itself of the opportunity to participate for the potential impact [new 
basic knowledge in physics, chemistry and the peacetime uses of nuclear science] may exert on its 
products and processes.”68 These and other responses from 1948 were aspirational. They discussed 
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the influence of IBR programs on their development efforts in the abstract and although they 
expressed optimism about concrete payoffs in the future, they could point to none as of yet. 
In years immediately after World War II, Chicago’s strategy was a success. By 1950 the 
IBRs had secured membership commitments from twenty-four industrial sponsors, including 
powerhouse corporations such as Standard Oil, DuPont, and US Steel.69 The early 1950s brought 
trouble, however, as a number of sponsors failed to renew and enrolling new members proved 
more difficult. Standard Oil of New Jersey, the first IBR sponsor, withdrew its support in 1953.70 
The program faltered on two points. First, corporations that had been enrolled to $50,000-per-year 
memberships had difficulty convincing their boards to maintain such investment in the absence of 
specific returns. Because Chicago was unconcerned with articulating the applied relevance of their 
work, any corporation that had not made those connections on its own began to view its 
membership as less of an investment and more of a charitable donation. 
Second, other universities began to develop similar programs, and many were less 
scrupulous about isolating their researchers from industrial interests. Change was also afoot at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which, like Chicago, saw the value of securing the resources 
wartime government investment had deposited on its campus. In the 1950s, MIT invested in a 
cooperative relationship with government and industry. Arthur von Hippel, longtime director of 
the Laboratory for Insulation Research (LIR) outlined MIT’s approach in a report entitled 
“Universities in Transition,” describing the essentials of what has come to be known as the “center 
model” of research.71 He sketched a new reality in which: “Universities showed that research pays, 
and huge laboratories sprang up for profit; universities devised new weapons, and the country 
bristles with laboratories for defense. What an outcome of a search for understanding of nature 
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and for peace in our time!”72 Autonomy was also central to von Hippel’s vision, but as he 
understood it, that meant allowing universities researchers the institutional freedom to cluster 
themselves around pressing problems, irrespective of departmental boundaries, and supporting 
such clusters with physical space and financial resources. The “Center,” in this formulation, 
consisted of “a cell structure of individually functioning laboratories, each with an inspiring 
program uniquely its own, but together creating a new spiritual entity.”73 
Although vaguely redolent of the developments underway at Chicago, von Hippel’s vision 
rested on fundamentally different assumptions. It relied on the inherent purity of scientists’ 
motivations and assumed that when permitted to choose their own research directions they would 
invariable blaze a trail in worthwhile directions. The boundaries between academic and industrial 
institutions should be fluid on this view, allowing researchers the freedom to respond dynamically 
to any unfulfilled needs they identified. Hutchins, predictably, was less sanguine about such a 
possibility. He regarded scientists as unscrupulous academic politicians, and as such was more 
deeply suspicious about the potential for scientific graft. Whereas von Hippel—and his allies in 
developing the interdepartmental laboratories at MIT, notably John C. Slater and Karl Compton—
advocated a bottom-up approach to a research center’s mission orientation, Hutchins preferred to 
impose an institutional ideology from the top down. Chicago therefore lost actual and potential 
patrons to institutions that were more willing to work directly toward applied ends. 
Both the brief success and rapid decline of Chicago’s funding model for its Institutes for 
Basic Research reveal much about patronage in early post–World War II America. First, industry 
exhibited new enthusiasm for funding university science, but the exact form the institutional 
relationship would take was still being negotiated. For a time, many corporations were content to 
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accept abstract promises of applied outcomes for the sake of participating in a cultural enterprise 
that aligned abstractly with their long-term interests. The slow failure of Chicago’s program to 
work to the same extent as programs at other universities that cultivated closer ties with the 
interests of industry suggests that the corporate ethos that favored direct, short term benefits 
emerged slowly, and was not the default position after World War II. Both of these facets of this 
story indicate the extent to which the influence of money over research is negotiated, on the 
individual scale and the societal scale. 
 
Conclusions 
Chicago’s approach to funding the Institutes for Basic Research echoed the fundraising 
strategies Frederick Taylor Gates outlined in 1890. Their development officers might have donned 
the garb they thought would impress their targets, but the goal was to convince potential patrons 
that the cause was a worthy one. This approach might have seemed old fashioned, and it was 
certainly out of step with the rise of mission-oriented research funding that would become more 
common throughout the Cold War, but it was also, in a way, prescient. The 1970s and 1980s 
would see a reaction within the physics community against funding that was increasingly tied to 
technical deliverables.74 Chicago’s approach need not be read as a quaint holdover from an earlier 
era. Rather, it can be seen as a measured attempt to frame a mode of financial support that could 
coexist with the large-scale trends toward applied research and to protect a brand of research it 
feared would be threatened by the militarization of the physical sciences. 
The impetus to engineer patronage relationships so as to insulate scientists from pressures 
exerted by broader societal trends derived from Robert Maynard Hutchins’s educational 
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philosophy. Hutchins had been concerned about the corrupting effects of money on educational 
institutions since arriving on the Midway. He perceived danger in links between football and 
alumni giving and applied the same caution when American industries regarded universities as 
sites of useful knowledge after World War II. Chicago, like other universities that had hosted war 
work, developed a plan to maintain the infrastructure the War Department had established on its 
campus; however, it implemented a plan that differed markedly from many of its peer institutions. 
Rather than seizing the opportunity to consolidate its objectives with the government and industry 
in order to better tackle the problems facing society, Hutchins perceived of consolidation itself as a 
threat to his educational vision and sought to differentiate his institution’s scientific mission as 
best he could from that of its patrons. 
That Chicago was able to pursue this course successfully during the years immediately 
following World War II betrays the flexibility of the context, and the latitude individuals and 
institutions enjoyed within it. Industry and academia had previously interacted comparatively 
little, and few protocols existed to govern their relationships other than those that had prevailed 
during wartime. Though some prominent institutions did choose to perpetuate the alignment of 
objectives that had marked war work, it was by no means the only option for universities or for 
industry in the mid- to late 1940s. Scientists themselves had become accustomed to supplementing 
their training with fellowships from the Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations in the first half of 
the twentieth century, and had good reason to believe, given the prominence basic scientific 
research had attained during the war, that a broader range of industries might be interested in 
supporting it for its own sake.75 For a time, many were. Only gradually did a more rigid, quid pro 
quo ethos began to prevail. 
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It eventually did prevail not because this was the inevitable mode of interaction between 
academia and industry, but because that is the relationship that was negotiated on a national scale. 
The University of Chicago’s scientists and administrators similarly recognized that the question of 
the extent to which money would influence research direction was an open one in the late 1940s. 
It is reasonable to extend this insight into the larger claim that other institutions, those that did 
permit external interests a greater role in shaping the investigations conducted on their campuses, 
saw this influence as a valuable bargaining chip and exercised their own agency in placing it on the 
table. Indeed, studies of both MIT and Caltech have suggested that university administrators 
exerted just as much agency as government and industry actors in crafting the alignment of their 
interests.76 Individual funding arrangements are negotiated, but so are large-scale expectations for 
what is appropriate when two institutional contexts come into contact. As local patronage 
relationships were being hammered out in the wake of World War II, those more general 
expectations were also in flux. The representatives of the University of Chicago backed one vision 
for the basis upon which industry and academia should interact, drawn from its educational 
philosophy. It was not the vision that would come to characterize Cold War academia–industry 
interactions more broadly, but it was viable for a time and it was not unreasonable from the 
perspective of the time to suppose that it might prevail. 
Despite the unusual stance Chicago struck within American higher education, the route its 
IBRs steered into the early Cold War era appeared viable and inviting to other institutions as well. 
The University of Michigan, which in 1948 launched its Phoenix Project, a sui generis peaceful-
atom-project-cum-war-memorial, similarly eschewed federal support and viewed industry patronage 
as a likelier guarantor of academic freedom.77 The Purdue Research Foundation, founded in 1930 
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to increase cooperation between academic and industrial science, articulated the freedoms it 
expected researchers it supported to enjoy, encompassing control over the subject matter and 
direction of their research, and envisioned post–World War II programs that would “develop 
sponsor interest in the support of basic research controlled by [these] freedoms.”78 These are but 
brief examples, but they demonstrate that Chicago’s scientists and administrators were not alone 
in recognizing the opportunity they exploited to launch the IBRs. Skepticism of federal support for 
science, especially nuclear science, was widespread for some time after the establishment of the 
National Science Foundation in 1950.79 And the federal policy of concentrating funding in already 
well-resourced, mostly coastal institutions continued to incentivize others to turn for their basic 
research needs to industry, which, for a time, was happy to oblige.80 The full influence of these 
attitudes on American higher education in the early Cold War remains to be explored. 
As the industrial funding model of the IBRs began to show its first cracks in 1950, Cyril 
Stanley Smith wrote to Walter Bartky:  
I believe that universities generally have already gone so far in the direction of being 
“useful” to industry and to government that they have come very near to failing in one of 
their most important functions, which is to provide a place for intellectual activity 
insulated from contemporary pressures, whether military, political, or social. I think it 
probable that in century-long perspective the greatest national service that the University of 
Chicago could provide would be to cultivate the sciences, the arts, and the humanities for 
their intrinsic values. 
Following this clean, aspirational statement of the Institutes’ identity, Smith wrote: “Though this 
would be the simplest course, it is also the most courageous.”81 At the close of World War II 
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scientists and humanists alike felt that courage was required to face the challenges of a nuclear 
world. In this sense, the University of Chicago’s educational reforms and approach to funding 
science, which were in many ways idiosyncratic and out of step with national trends, were very 
much of their time. 
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